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Meta-ethics is the branch of moral philosophy that asks questions not about what is right or wrong, but about the nature, meaning, and status of moral claims themselves. When someone says "murder is wrong," what kind of statement are they making? Are they stating a fact, expressing a feeling, or issuing a command? Can moral statements be true or false? These are the central questions of meta-ethics, and they are essential for the AQA A-Level Religious Studies specification.
Key Definition: Meta-ethics is the study of the meaning, nature, and justification of moral language and moral judgements. It asks what we mean when we say something is "good" or "wrong," rather than which specific actions are good or wrong.
The most fundamental distinction in meta-ethics is between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
| Position | Key Claim | Moral Statements Are... | Truth Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitivism | Moral statements express beliefs about the world | Propositions that can be true or false | Yes |
| Non-cognitivism | Moral statements do not express beliefs | Expressions of emotion, attitude, or prescription | No |
Cognitivists hold that moral statements are truth-apt — they express propositions that are either true or false. When I say "murder is wrong," I am stating a fact about the world (or about human nature, or about God's commands) that can, in principle, be verified or falsified.
Non-cognitivists deny that moral statements express factual beliefs. Instead, they express emotions, attitudes, or commands. When I say "murder is wrong," I am not describing a feature of the world — I am expressing my disapproval or instructing others not to murder.
Ethical naturalism holds that moral properties are identical to, or can be reduced to, natural (empirical) properties. Moral statements are factual claims about the natural world and can be verified through observation and experience.
Example: "Happiness is good" — on a naturalist view, "good" simply means something like "that which promotes human happiness" or "that which is desired." Moral claims can therefore be tested empirically.
Bradley argued that moral statements are objectively true or false and can be grounded in observable social and psychological facts. He held that morality is rooted in the individual's role within their community — to be moral is to fulfil one's social obligations.
G. E. Moore mounted the most famous attack on ethical naturalism in his 1903 work Principia Ethica. Moore argued that naturalists commit the naturalistic fallacy — they wrongly attempt to define "good" in terms of some natural property (e.g., pleasure, happiness, evolutionary fitness).
Key Definition: The naturalistic fallacy is the error of defining "good" in terms of any natural property. Moore argued that "good" is a simple, indefinable quality — like "yellow" — that cannot be reduced to anything else.
Moore used the open question argument: for any natural property X (e.g., pleasure), it always makes sense to ask, "But is X really good?" The fact that this question remains open and meaningful shows that "good" cannot simply mean "pleasurable" — the two concepts are not identical.
Example: If "good" meant "that which produces pleasure," then the statement "pleasure is good" would be a tautology (like saying "pleasure is pleasurable"). But it is clearly a substantive claim, not a tautology. Therefore "good" and "pleasure" are not the same thing.
Intuitionism holds that moral truths exist objectively and are known through a special faculty of moral intuition rather than through sense experience or rational argument. Moral properties are real but non-natural — they cannot be reduced to natural facts.
Having rejected naturalism, Moore proposed that "good" is a simple, non-natural property that we recognise directly through intuition, just as we recognise the colour yellow through sight. We cannot define "good," but we can recognise it when we see it.
Pritchard argued that moral obligations are self-evident. When we consider a situation carefully, we simply "see" what we ought to do. This moral knowledge is direct and immediate — it does not require proof or argument. He called attempts to prove moral obligations a fundamental mistake, which he explored in his 1912 essay "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?".
Ross developed intuitionism further by proposing a list of prima facie duties — duties that are binding unless overridden by a stronger duty in a particular situation. These include:
When duties conflict, we must use moral judgement to determine which takes precedence. Ross argued that this judgement is intuitive — there is no algorithm for resolving moral conflicts.
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