The Evidential Problem of Evil

The Evidential Problem of Evil

While the logical problem of evil claims that God and evil are strictly logically incompatible, the evidential problem of evil makes a more modest but arguably more devastating claim: the sheer amount, distribution, and apparent pointlessness of much of the evil and suffering in the world makes the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God highly improbable. This is an inductive rather than deductive argument — it deals in probabilities rather than logical necessities. For many contemporary philosophers, the evidential problem is now the most serious challenge to theistic belief.

William Rowe’s Formulation

William Rowe (1931–2015) presented the most influential version of the evidential argument in his 1979 paper “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” Rowe’s argument is structured as follows:

• Premise 1: There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse
• Premise 2: An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse
• Conclusion: Therefore, an omniscient, wholly good being (God) does not exist

The crucial move is Premise 1. Rowe does not claim certainty — he claims that it is reasonable to believe, based on careful reflection, that at least some suffering in the world serves no justifying purpose. This is sometimes called the claim that gratuitous evil exists — evil that is not necessary for any greater good.

Rowe’s Fawn Example

To illustrate the existence of apparently gratuitous suffering, Rowe offered a vivid example that has become central to the philosophical literature:

Suppose a fawn is trapped in a forest fire. It is horribly burned and lies in terrible agony for several days before dying. No human being is aware of its suffering. Its pain serves no apparent purpose — it does not build character, it does not serve as a warning to others, it does not contribute to any discernible greater good. It is simply pointless suffering.

Rowe argued that when we carefully consider such cases, it is reasonable to conclude that at least some of this suffering is genuinely gratuitous — it serves no justifying purpose that an omnipotent God could not have achieved by other means. If even one instance of truly gratuitous evil exists, then God (as traditionally conceived) does not exist.

The “Noseeum” Inference

Rowe’s argument relies on what philosophers call a “noseeum” inference: if, after careful reflection, we cannot see any justifying reason for a particular instance of suffering, it is reasonable to conclude that there probably is no such reason. This is an application of a common epistemic principle — the absence of evidence, in certain contexts, constitutes evidence of absence.

Consider an analogy: if you search a room thoroughly and find no elephant, you are justified in concluding that there is probably no elephant in the room. Similarly, if, after careful philosophical and theological reflection, we cannot identify any morally sufficient reason for a fawn’s horrible suffering, we are justified in concluding that there probably is no such reason.

Critiques of the Noseeum Inference

The noseeum inference has been challenged by several theistic philosophers: