Natural Evil and Animal Suffering

Natural Evil and Animal Suffering

Natural evil presents one of the most difficult challenges for any theodicy. Moral evil — the suffering caused by free human choices — can at least in principle be explained by appealing to the value of free will. But natural evil — the suffering caused by earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, diseases, parasites, predation, and other natural phenomena — appears to have no connection to human freedom. Furthermore, animal suffering raises profound questions that most theodicies struggle to answer: animals have suffered for hundreds of millions of years before humans even appeared on Earth, and they are generally not considered moral agents capable of the kind of soul-making that the Irenaean theodicy describes. This lesson examines the philosophical challenges posed by natural evil and animal suffering, and evaluates the various theological and philosophical responses.

The Problem of Natural Evil

Natural evil encompasses all suffering and destruction that results from natural processes rather than human agency:

• Geological events: Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, landslides
• Meteorological events: Hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, extreme temperatures
• Biological suffering: Disease, genetic disorders, parasitism, cancer, congenital disabilities
• Ecological processes: Predation, starvation, competition for resources

The scale of natural evil is staggering. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami killed approximately 230,000 people, including tens of thousands of children. The 1918 influenza pandemic killed an estimated 50–100 million people. The Black Death killed approximately one-third of Europe’s population in the fourteenth century. These events are not the result of human free will — they are the product of impersonal natural forces.

Theological Responses to Natural Evil

The major theodicies offer different explanations for natural evil:

• Augustinian approach: Natural evil is the result of the cosmic corruption caused by the Fall. Before Adam’s sin, the natural world was harmonious and free from suffering. After the Fall, the natural order became disordered. Problem: This is scientifically untenable — geological and biological evidence shows that natural disasters and animal suffering existed billions of years before humans appeared.
• Irenaean/soul-making approach: Natural evil is necessary for the development of human virtues. Earthquakes and diseases provide occasions for courage, compassion, solidarity, and scientific endeavour. A world without natural challenges would be a “toy world” incapable of producing genuine moral growth. Problem: Much natural evil falls on those least able to benefit from it — infants, the very elderly, the already impoverished. And natural evil existed for aeons before any humans existed to develop virtues.
• Free will defence (extended): Plantinga suggested that natural evil might be the result of the free choices of fallen angels who have corrupted the natural order. Problem: This is widely regarded as ad hoc and lacking in independent evidential support.
• Process theodicy: Natural evil results from the inherent self-determination of natural entities. Tectonic plates, viruses, and weather systems operate according to their own causal tendencies, which God influences but cannot override. Problem: This requires accepting a radically non-traditional concept of God.
• Natural law theodicy: Richard Swinburne has argued that a world governed by regular, predictable natural laws is necessary for meaningful human action, moral responsibility, and scientific knowledge. Without regular natural laws, we could not predict the consequences of our actions, learn from experience, or make meaningful moral choices. Natural evil is an unavoidable consequence of the regular natural laws that make meaningful human life possible. Problem: An omnipotent God could presumably have designed natural laws that achieved these purposes without producing quite so much suffering.

William Rowe’s Fawn

The problem of animal suffering is brought into sharpest focus by William Rowe’s famous example of the fawn (discussed in Lesson 2 on the evidential problem). A fawn is trapped in a forest fire, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before dying. No human being is aware of its suffering. Rowe argued that this suffering appears to be entirely gratuitous — it serves no discernible purpose, contributes to no greater good, and develops no virtue in any soul.

The fawn example is powerful because it isolates the problem of natural evil from questions about human free will and moral development. The fawn is not a moral agent; it cannot develop virtues through suffering; its agony is witnessed by no one and inspires no compassion. If God exists and is omnipotent, why does this suffering occur?

The Scale of Animal Suffering

The problem of animal suffering extends far beyond individual cases. Consider the following: