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After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both superpowers recognised the need to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The period from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s saw a gradual easing of tensions known as détente (a French word meaning "relaxation"). This lesson examines the key agreements, summits, and developments that characterised this period.
Détente was not the end of the Cold War — the superpowers remained rivals. Instead, it was a period of reduced tension and increased communication, driven by the recognition that nuclear war was unwinnable and must be avoided.
| Feature of Détente | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Arms control | Agreements to limit the growth of nuclear arsenals |
| Diplomacy | Regular summits between US and Soviet leaders |
| Trade | Increased economic cooperation |
| Cultural exchange | Joint scientific and cultural programmes |
| Reduced rhetoric | Less aggressive public language |
Key Term: Détente — a period of eased tension between the superpowers, primarily from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. It did not end the Cold War but made it less dangerous.
Both sides had practical reasons for wanting to reduce tensions.
| Reason | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Vietnam War | The USA was bogged down in Vietnam and could not afford another confrontation |
| Cost of arms race | Nuclear weapons were enormously expensive |
| Public opinion | The American public was tired of Cold War confrontation |
| Cuban Missile Crisis | The near-disaster of 1962 showed the need for better communication |
| Reason | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Economic problems | The Soviet economy was struggling to keep up with the arms race |
| Sino-Soviet split | The USSR's relationship with China had deteriorated sharply; the Soviets wanted to reduce the number of their enemies |
| Cuban Missile Crisis | Like the USA, the USSR was shaken by how close they had come to nuclear war |
| Desire for Western technology and trade | Access to Western goods and technology could help the Soviet economy |
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Signed | 26 May 1972, Moscow |
| Signatories | President Nixon (USA) and General Secretary Brezhnev (USSR) |
| Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty | Both sides limited to two ABM deployment sites each |
| Interim Agreement | Froze the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at existing levels for five years |
| Significance | First agreement to limit strategic nuclear weapons; symbolised the spirit of détente |
Exam Tip: SALT I did not reduce nuclear weapons — it only froze their numbers. Both sides could still develop new types of weapons and improve existing ones. This is an important limitation to note in exam answers.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) produced the Helsinki Accords, signed by 35 nations including the USA and the USSR.
| Basket | Content |
|---|---|
| Basket 1: Security | Recognition of post-war borders in Europe; respect for sovereignty |
| Basket 2: Cooperation | Increased economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation between East and West |
| Basket 3: Human rights | Commitment to respect human rights, including freedom of thought, religion, and movement |
The Helsinki Accords were controversial:
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Signed | 18 June 1979, Vienna |
| Signatories | President Carter (USA) and Brezhnev (USSR) |
| Agreement | Limited each side to 2,250 missile launchers; limited MIRVs (multiple warheads per missile) |
| Outcome | The US Senate never ratified SALT II because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 |
One of the most remarkable diplomatic moves of the Cold War was President Richard Nixon's visit to Communist China in February 1972.
| Significance | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Triangular diplomacy | Nixon exploited the Sino-Soviet split by building relations with China, putting pressure on the USSR |
| Leverage | The USSR was more willing to negotiate with the USA because it feared a US-China alliance |
| Symbolism | A US President visiting Mao's China was unthinkable just a few years earlier |
Exam Tip: Nixon's visit to China is a great example of how realpolitik (practical politics) overrode ideology during détente. Both the USA and China were willing to set aside their ideological differences for strategic gain.
Despite the agreements, détente had significant weaknesses.
| Limitation | Detail |
|---|---|
| Arms race continued | Both sides developed new weapons (e.g., MIRVs) not covered by treaties |
| Proxy wars | The superpowers continued to fight through allies (e.g., in Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America) |
| Human rights | The USSR largely ignored Basket 3 of the Helsinki Accords |
| Mutual suspicion | Neither side fully trusted the other |
| End of détente | The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) effectively ended détente |
| Key Event | Date | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| NPT | 1968 | Limited the spread of nuclear weapons |
| Nixon visits China | February 1972 | Exploited Sino-Soviet split |
| SALT I | May 1972 | First strategic arms limitation agreement |
| Helsinki Accords | 1975 | Recognised borders; introduced human rights commitments |
| SALT II | June 1979 | Further arms limits, but never ratified |
Détente was a period of genuine progress in US-Soviet relations, but it had clear limits. The arms race continued, proxy wars raged, and the spirit of cooperation was ultimately shattered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
Exam Tip: For a "How successful was détente?" question, weigh the genuine achievements (SALT I, Helsinki, reduced risk of nuclear war) against the limitations (continued arms race, proxy wars, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). A balanced answer that reaches a clear judgement will score highest.
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