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A trade union is an organised association of workers that bargains collectively with employers over pay, hours, conditions and job security. The previous four lessons built the labour market from the demand side (Lesson 1), the supply side (Lesson 2), the competitive equilibrium (Lesson 3) and the monopsony case (Lesson 4). This lesson introduces the second great source of market power in labour markets — power on the workers' side of the bargain — and it produces the single most important and most heavily examined result in the whole module: a union's effect on employment is not fixed; it depends entirely on the market structure it operates in. In a competitive market a union that pushes the wage above equilibrium causes a wage/employment trade-off — higher pay, fewer jobs. But in a monopsony market the very same union action can raise both the wage and employment, because the monopsonist was already restricting jobs below the efficient level. Mastering this "it depends on the market structure" result — and being able to draw both diagrams — is the difference between a mid-band and a top-band answer on this topic. By the end you should be able to derive the competitive wage floor, the monopsony correction, and the indeterminate bilateral-monopoly outcome, and evaluate the role of unions in the modern UK economy.
This lesson sits within Section 4.1.6 — The labour market of the AQA A-Level Economics (7136) specification, the microeconomics half of the course (4.1 Individuals, firms, markets and market failure). It builds directly on the competitive model (Lesson 3) and the monopsony model (Lesson 4), and feeds into the minimum-wage analysis (Lesson 6) and the inequality content of 4.1.7.
Exam Tip: The examiner's favourite trade-union question is some version of "do trade unions cause unemployment?" The single best opening move is to refuse the premise of a one-size-fits-all answer: "It depends on the market structure." That sentence frames the entire essay around the competitive-versus-monopsony contrast and signposts a top-band evaluation from the first line.
Key Definition: A trade union is an association of workers formed to protect and advance the interests of its members through collective bargaining with employers and, where necessary, industrial action.
The economic rationale for unions is that an individual worker bargaining alone against a large employer has very little power — especially where the employer has monopsony power (Lesson 4). By combining, workers turn many weak individual bargains into one strong collective bargain, raising their bargaining power closer to that of the employer. In effect, a union acts as a monopoly supplier of labour: just as a monopolist is the sole seller of a product, a union that organises an entire workforce becomes the sole seller of that labour, and can use that position to negotiate a higher wage than atomistic competition would yield.
Key Definition: Collective bargaining is the process by which a trade union negotiates pay and conditions on behalf of all the workers it represents, rather than each worker negotiating individually.
| Type | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Craft union | Represents workers sharing a particular skill or trade | Musicians' Union |
| Industrial union | Represents all workers in a specific industry regardless of job | Historically the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) |
| General union | Represents workers across many industries and occupations | GMB; Unite the Union |
| White-collar / professional union | Represents professional, technical and office workers | British Medical Association (BMA); National Education Union (NEU) |
In practice many modern unions are conglomerate unions formed by mergers. Unite (created from Amicus and the T&GWU in 2007) is among the UK's largest unions, with well over a million members across manufacturing, transport, health, construction and public services. The trend toward large general unions partly reflects the search for economies of scale in bargaining and the decline of the single-industry workplaces that once sustained narrow craft and industrial unions.
Trade union membership and density (the share of the workforce in a union) have fallen sharply from their late-1970s peak:
| Year | Union Members (millions, approx.) | Density (% of employees, approx.) |
|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 13.2 | 55% |
| 1990 | 9.9 | 38% |
| 2000 | 7.3 | 29% |
| 2010 | 6.5 | 27% |
| 2023 | 6.3 | 22% |
Source: official UK trade-union membership statistics (BEIS / DBT series). Figures rounded; treat as indicative.
Exam Tip: Do not just list the causes of decline — rank them. The structural shift from manufacturing to services is the most important long-run driver; legislation was the decisive short-run trigger in the 1980s. Distinguishing long-run structural change from short-run policy shocks is itself an AO3 analytical move.
There are three models you must be able to deploy. The decisive insight is that the employment consequence flips sign between the competitive and monopsony cases.
If a union can control entry to an occupation — historically through the closed shop (compulsory union membership), and still through apprenticeship gateways or professional licensing — it shifts the supply curve of labour leftward, from S1 to S2. With the demand for labour (MRPL) unchanged, the new intersection sits higher and to the left: the wage rises from W1 to W2 but employment falls from L1 to L2. The shrinkage of supply is precisely what generates the higher wage, and the workers who remain inside the occupation enjoy a larger slice of economic rent (Lesson 3), because the artificial scarcity lifts their pay above what their next-best alternative would offer. The closed shop was outlawed in the UK, so the compulsory-membership version is now of mainly historical and comparative interest. But the licensing version persists wherever a profession tightly controls who may practise — and the same logic explains why occupational licensing, even when justified on quality or safety grounds, can have the side effect of raising insiders' wages by restricting supply.
This is the central competitive result. Through collective bargaining the union negotiates a wage floor Wu above the competitive equilibrium W∗. No worker will supply labour below Wu, so the effective supply curve becomes horizontal at Wu up to the point where it rejoins the original upward-sloping supply curve, then follows the original supply.
The consequences:
How large the employment fall is depends on the wage-elasticity of demand for labour (Lesson 1, Marshall's Rules). Where labour demand is inelastic — capital is a poor substitute, product demand is inelastic, labour is a small share of cost — the union can win a large wage rise for a small employment loss, so the trade-off is favourable to the union. Where demand is elastic, the same wage rise destroys many jobs. This is why unions tend to be most effective (and least damaging to employment) precisely where Marshall's Rules make labour demand inelastic.
Now place the union in a monopsony market (Lesson 4), where the employer was already paying Wm below the competitive wage Wc and restricting employment to Lm (hiring where MCL=MRPL but paying off the supply curve). A monopoly union now faces a monopsony employer — a bilateral monopoly.
Key Definition: A bilateral monopoly exists when a monopoly supplier of labour (the union) bargains with a monopsony buyer of labour (the employer). The outcome is theoretically indeterminate: the wage settles somewhere between the monopsonist's preferred Wm and the union's maximum demand, and where it settles depends on the relative bargaining power of the two sides.
The decisive mechanism is the same horizontal-supply trick as Model 2 — but here it works in the opposite direction on employment. When the union imposes a floor Wu, the firm's effective supply (and hence its ACL) becomes horizontal at Wu up to the original supply curve. Crucially, over that flat segment the marginal cost of labour equals the wage:
MCL=ACL=Wu(over the floored, horizontal segment)
The wedge between MCL and ACL that drove the monopsonist to restrict employment (Lesson 4) disappears along the floor. The firm now profit-maximises where this flat MCL meets MRPL — which lies at a higher level of employment than the monopsony Lm. So provided the union sets the floor in the right zone, both the wage and employment rise toward the competitive outcome.
This is one of the most important results in labour economics: a trade union can correct monopsonistic exploitation, simultaneously raising pay and jobs and reducing the deadweight loss the monopsonist created. It is the mirror image of how a maximum price can raise output in a monopoly product market. It also explains why unions in heavily monopsonistic sectors — the NHS being the paradigm UK case — can credibly argue that higher pay would not cost jobs, because the employer was suppressing both pay and headcount to begin with.
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