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The February Revolution of 1917 (March by the Western calendar) brought about the sudden and largely unexpected collapse of the Romanov dynasty after more than 300 years. The revolution was not planned by any political party — it erupted from below, driven by war-weariness, hunger, and accumulated grievances. The resulting system of dual power, in which the Provisional Government shared authority uneasily with the Petrograd Soviet, proved inherently unstable and set the stage for the Bolshevik seizure of power in October.
For the breadth study, February 1917 is the great hinge of the whole century — the moment at which the autocratic order that had survived since before 1855 finally fell, opening the way to the Soviet system that would dominate the rest of the period. The central analytical task is twofold: first, to explain why the autocracy that had survived 1905 collapsed so completely in 1917 (the role of the First World War is decisive here); and second, to explain why the liberal, democratic experiment of February failed so quickly, creating the conditions for October. The contrast between the spontaneous, leaderless February Revolution and the planned, disciplined October seizure of power is one of the richest comparisons the course offers.
Key Question: Why did the Romanov autocracy collapse in February 1917, and why was the democratic alternative it left behind unable to consolidate itself?
Key Definition: Dual Power (dvoevlastie) — the coexistence of two competing centres of authority after the February Revolution: the Provisional Government, drawn from the Duma and representing the propertied classes and liberals, which possessed formal authority but little popular backing; and the Petrograd Soviet, representing the workers and soldiers, which commanded genuine popular support and controlled the streets, the railways, and the garrison. Neither could govern effectively without the other, and the contradiction proved fatal.
This lesson marks the transition from Part One (Autocracy, Reform and Revolution, 1855–1917) to the revolutionary watershed within Component 1H of AQA's A-Level History specification (7042), studied as a Paper 1 breadth study. The fall of the autocracy and the failure of dual power are essential to the causation and change judgements that span the Tsarist–Soviet divide.
The relevant Assessment Objectives are:
The change-and-continuity threads advanced here are dramatic. The autocracy and the state thread reaches its terminus: 300 years of Romanov rule ends, but the problem of how to govern Russia — and the vacuum the autocracy left — passes to the Provisional Government and then the Bolsheviks. The revolution thread reaches fulfilment as the soviet, born in 1905, re-emerges to share power. The reform-versus-repression thread is recast as the question of whether liberal reform could ever stabilise revolutionary Russia. And the modernisation and economy thread underlies everything, since it was the collapse of the war economy — transport, food, prices — that brought the people onto the streets. Students should constantly compare February 1917 with the survival of the regime in 1905, and the failed liberalism of the Provisional Government with the ruthlessness that would let the Bolsheviks hold power.
The First World War was the decisive catalyst for revolution. By the winter of 1916–17, Russia's military, economic, and social systems were all in deep crisis, and the strain of total war had achieved what the crisis of 1905 had not — the destruction of the army's loyalty to the throne.
| Problem | Detail |
|---|---|
| Defeats | The catastrophes at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes (1914) destroyed Russia's invasion of East Prussia; the Great Retreat of 1915 surrendered Poland, Lithuania, and much of the western borderlands |
| Casualties | By 1917, Russian war dead numbered in the millions, with total casualties (killed, wounded, captured) running far higher — among the heaviest of any combatant |
| Equipment shortages | In 1915 especially, shortages of rifles, shells, and boots were acute, though supply improved somewhat by 1916 |
| Leadership | Nicholas II's fateful decision to assume personal command of the army in August 1915 made him directly and personally responsible for every subsequent defeat |
| Desertion and war-weariness | By 1917 morale was collapsing, desertion was rising, and the conscript-soldiers — peasants in uniform — were increasingly receptive to revolutionary slogans of peace and land |
The decision to take personal command in 1915 was perhaps Nicholas's gravest error of the war. It tied the prestige of the throne directly to the fortunes of the front, removed the Tsar from the capital (leaving government in the hands of the unpopular Alexandra), and meant that military failure now translated immediately into political delegitimisation of the monarchy itself.
Grigori Rasputin, a Siberian holy man (starets) who appeared able to ease the suffering of the haemophiliac Tsarevich Alexei, gained extraordinary and damaging influence over the Tsarina Alexandra, especially after Nicholas departed for the front in 1915.
The historian Orlando Figes argues that Rasputin's significance was as much symbolic as real: he was both a symptom of the monarchy's isolation and dysfunction and a cause of the elite's loss of faith in the regime. The 'Rasputin scandal' meant that by early 1917 even monarchists had concluded that Nicholas and Alexandra were leading the dynasty to ruin.
| Date (Western Calendar) | Event |
|---|---|
| 23 February / 8 March | International Women's Day — women textile workers in Petrograd went on strike demanding bread, drawing in workers from other factories |
| 24 February / 9 March | The strike spread rapidly; very large numbers of workers were now on strike across the capital |
| 25 February / 10 March | A general strike shut down Petrograd; demonstrators carried banners reading 'Down with the Tsar' and 'Down with the War', and the protest became openly political |
| 26 February / 11 March | Troops were ordered to fire on the demonstrators; some units obeyed, killing protesters, but unrest spread to the barracks |
| 27 February / 12 March | The decisive turning point — soldiers of the Volynsky and other guards regiments refused to fire and mutinied, joining the demonstrators with their weapons; the garrison went over to the revolution |
| 27 February / 12 March | The Petrograd Soviet was formed in the Tauride Palace; Duma members formed a Provisional Committee |
| 2 March / 15 March | Nicholas II abdicated, first in favour of Alexei, then of his brother Grand Duke Michael, who declined the throne; the Provisional Government was formed |
The February Revolution was remarkable above all for what it was not:
The historian Rex Wade emphasises the spontaneous and popular character of the February Revolution, arguing that it was driven from below by the accumulated frustrations of workers, soldiers, and ordinary people rather than directed by professional revolutionaries.
Exam Tip: The spontaneity of February is significant for the analysis of historical causation and for the comparison with October. It suggests that long-term structural factors (autocracy, inequality, the unresolved land question) combined with the medium-term catastrophe of the war to create conditions in which a spark — bread queues and a garrison mutiny — could topple the regime, with no one controlling the process. This contrasts sharply with the October Revolution, which was meticulously planned by a disciplined party. Holding the two together illuminates the whole debate about whether the revolutions were 'made' or 'happened'.
The Provisional Government was formed by members of the Duma's Provisional Committee, drawn from the liberal and moderate parties.
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Composition | Initially led by Prince Lvov; dominated by Kadets and liberals; from May it became a coalition including moderate socialists |
| Legitimacy | Self-appointed and unelected; it explicitly regarded itself as 'provisional', holding power only until a freely elected Constituent Assembly could decide Russia's future |
| Reforms | Granted sweeping civil liberties — freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion; abolished the death penalty; declared a political amnesty; promised equality regardless of class, religion, or nationality; legalised trade unions |
| Fatal decisions | It chose to continue the war; it postponed land reform until the Constituent Assembly; and it failed to solve the food and economic crisis |
The Provisional Government's reforms made Russia, briefly, one of the freest countries in the world — but freedom did not feed the cities, end the war, or give the peasants land. Its three fatal decisions flowed from a defensible logic (Russia's alliance obligations, the impropriety of an unelected body redistributing land, the practical difficulty of the food crisis), but each decision steadily eroded its support and handed the Bolsheviks their winning slogans.
Alexander Kerensky was the only man to sit in both the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, embodying the link — and the contradiction — between them. A dramatic orator, he became Minister of Justice, then War Minister in May, and Prime Minister from July. Charismatic but increasingly isolated and indecisive, he came to symbolise the Provisional Government's impossible position: trying to satisfy liberals, socialists, the Allies, the generals, the workers, and the peasants simultaneously, and ultimately satisfying none of them.
The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, formed on 27 February in the Tauride Palace (the same building as the Duma), was the real power in the capital.
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Composition | Directly elected representatives of workers and, crucially, soldiers; initially dominated by the moderate socialists — Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries |
| Order No. 1 | Issued on 1 March, it instructed soldiers to obey the Provisional Government only where its orders did not contradict the Soviet, and placed control of weapons in the hands of soldiers' committees — effectively giving the Soviet, not the government, command of the garrison |
| Popular legitimacy | The Soviet commanded the genuine allegiance of the workers and soldiers that the Provisional Government conspicuously lacked |
| Conditional support | The moderate-led Soviet at first agreed to support the Provisional Government only 'in so far as' (postolku-poskolku) it pursued acceptable policies — a deeply conditional backing |
Order No. 1 is one of the most important documents of the revolution. By subordinating military obedience to the Soviet's approval, it ensured that real coercive power lay with the Soviet from the very beginning, while formal responsibility lay with the government. The historian Sheila Fitzpatrick captures the resulting situation by describing dual power as inherently unstable — a system in which one body possessed authority without power while the other possessed power without responsibility.
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