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If secularisation theory claims that religion is declining, the renewal-and-choice perspective replies that religion is not dying but mutating. Its leading thinkers argue that the institutional, congregational, "belonging" side of religion is contracting, while belief, spirituality, and religious consumption are being reorganised around individual choice. Religion is becoming privatised, de-traditionalised, and pluralised — a matter of personal selection rather than inherited obligation. This lesson examines four positions: Grace Davie (believing without belonging; vicarious religion), Danièle Hervieu-Léger (cultural amnesia; spiritual shopping; pilgrims and converts), Stark and Bainbridge's religious market theory, and Heelas and Woodhead's spiritual-revolution thesis (the Kendal Project). David Lyon's postmodern Jesus in Disneyland completes the picture. The central evaluative axis is whether "choice" represents the vitality of religion or merely a softer, terminal phase of secularisation.
Key Definition: Religious renewal is the revitalisation or transformation of belief and practice into new forms rather than its simple disappearance. Religious choice is the late-modern condition in which individuals select their beliefs and practices from a plural market of options rather than inheriting them from tradition and community.
This lesson addresses the AQA A-Level Sociology (7192) specification, examined in Paper 2 (7192/2): Topics in Sociology, Section B — Beliefs in Society. Within that topic it covers:
Grace Davie (1994, 2007) mounted the most influential British challenge to secularisation. Her starting point is that the steep fall in church attendance does not prove a fall in belief. Survey evidence repeatedly shows that the proportion of Britons who describe themselves as believers, who pray, or who hold to some notion of God or "a higher power" is markedly higher than the proportion who attend services. Davie captured this gap in the phrase "believing without belonging": people retain private faith while detaching from institutional membership.
In her later work Davie refined the idea into the concept of vicarious religion — religion performed by an active minority on behalf of a much larger majority who implicitly approve. The few who attend, maintain the buildings, and conduct the rituals act as a kind of public religious resource. The majority do not participate week-to-week, but they:
Religion, on this view, functions rather like a public utility: most people do not use it daily, but they want it maintained and resent its disappearance. Davie contrasts this European pattern with the market model of the USA, where religion is consumed actively and competitively. This Europe/USA contrast leads her to argue that Europe is the exceptional case, not the global template — secularisation is not the inevitable accompaniment of modernity but a peculiarly European trajectory.
Exam Tip: Distinguish Davie's two ideas precisely. "Believing without belonging" is a claim about individuals (private belief persists). "Vicarious religion" is a claim about a social relationship (the active few perform religion for the passive many). Conflating them loses the marks for conceptual discrimination.
Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2000) offers a memory-based account. Religion, she argues, is fundamentally a chain of memory — a tradition transmitted across generations that binds the living to the dead and to a shared past. What modern societies have lost is not the human capacity for religion but the mechanisms of transmission.
In the past, religion was passed on automatically: children were socialised into the faith of their parents within stable, geographically rooted communities, reinforced by school, neighbourhood, and extended family. Modernity has shattered this. Geographical and social mobility, the decline of the extended family, and the marginalisation of religious education have produced what Hervieu-Léger calls cultural amnesia — a break in the chain of memory. Young people are no longer reliably inducted into a religious tradition; religion becomes one option among many in a plural culture.
Crucially, Hervieu-Léger does not conclude that religion vanishes. Instead, individualism transforms it. People become spiritual shoppers, assembling personal belief-packages from a wide menu of resources. She identifies two characteristic late-modern religious types:
Both types are products of the same condition: where tradition no longer hands religion down, individuals must choose it, either by wandering (pilgrims) or by committing (converts).
Key Definition: A chain of memory is the inter-generational transmission of a religious tradition that links individuals to a community of believers extending into the past; cultural amnesia is the breaking of that chain in modern, mobile, individualised societies.
Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge (1985) reject the secularisation thesis outright and replace it with religious market theory (also called rational-choice or supply-side theory). Drawing on the language of economics, they argue that religion does not decline; rather, the demand for religion is constant because human beings universally seek compensators — credible promises of rewards (eternal life, ultimate meaning, divine justice) that cannot be obtained in the here-and-now. What varies is supply.
The key claim is that secularisation theorists have mistaken a change in the religious market for a decline in religion. Where a single church enjoys a state-backed monopoly (much of historic Europe), it grows complacent, lazy, and unresponsive — like any monopoly producer — so participation falls. Where there is a free, competitive religious market with no established church (the USA), religious "firms" must compete vigorously for members, producing energetic, attractive, responsive religion and therefore high participation. Religious vitality, on this account, is a function of competition and pluralism, not of how modern or scientific a society is.
This generates the central paradox of the theory: religious diversity — which secularisation theorists like Berger once saw as corrosive to faith (the "plausibility problem") — is reinterpreted as the very engine of religious strength.
Stark and Bainbridge add that religion regenerates itself through ongoing cycles. As established churches accommodate to the secular world and lose their supernatural distinctiveness, they leave a gap that is filled by sect formation (revival of demanding, otherworldly religion) and cult innovation (entirely new spiritualities). Secularisation, revival, and innovation are therefore permanent, self-correcting features of any religious economy, not a one-way historical road to irreligion.
| Feature | Religious monopoly (e.g. historic Europe) | Religious free market (e.g. USA) |
|---|---|---|
| Number of "firms" | One established church | Many competing denominations/sects |
| Incentive to recruit | Weak — guaranteed members | Strong — must win members |
| Quality/energy of provision | Low, complacent | High, dynamic |
| Predicted participation | Low | High |
| Interpretation of decline | "Lazy monopoly," not lost demand | n/a — vitality is the norm |
Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead (2005) investigated the spiritual revolution thesis — the claim that traditional, congregational religion is being displaced by a new, individualised spirituality of the self. Their Kendal Project studied all the religious and spiritual activity in one Cumbrian town and distinguished two zones.
The migration from one domain to the other reflects what Heelas and Woodhead, following Charles Taylor, call the subjective turn in modern culture: the shift from living by external roles and duties ("life-as") to cultivating one's own inner experience and authenticity ("subjective-life"). Traditional religion, which subordinates the self to external authority, is increasingly out of step with this culture; the holistic milieu, which sacralises the self, is in tune with it. This is why the milieu attracts those most invested in subjective fulfilment.
graph TD
A["Secularisation thesis: religion is declining"] --> B["Renewal / choice reply: religion is transforming"]
B --> C["Davie: believing without belonging + vicarious religion"]
B --> D["Hervieu-Léger: cultural amnesia -> pilgrims and converts"]
B --> E["Stark & Bainbridge: religious market theory (supply-side)"]
B --> F["Heelas & Woodhead: subjective turn"]
F --> G["Congregational domain: external authority (declining)"]
F --> H["Holistic milieu: inner self / subjective-life (growing)"]
C --> I{"Choice = vitality or terminal secularisation?"}
D --> I
E --> I
H --> I
I --> J["Bruce: holistic milieu too small; belief without belonging fades"]
| Congregational domain | Holistic milieu | |
|---|---|---|
| Share of the town's population | Small minority (a few per cent) | Much smaller still (around one in sixty) |
| Trend | Declining | Growing |
| Dominant ethos | External authority, tradition, conformity | Inner authority, self-exploration, experience |
| Typical participants | Older, more traditional | Disproportionately middle-aged, middle-class women |
Their verdict was carefully hedged: there was a partial and prospective revolution. The holistic milieu was growing while the congregational domain shrank, so on present trends the milieu might one day overtake congregational religion — but at the time of study it remained far too small to have replaced it. Spirituality was rising, but it had not yet won.
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