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Patterns of marriage, cohabitation and divorce in Britain have changed dramatically since the mid-twentieth century, and these changes lie at the heart of the AQA A-Level Sociology (7192) Families and Households topic. Fewer people marry, those who do marry later, cohabitation has become a mainstream stage of relationship life, and divorce — though it has fallen back from its early-1990s peak — remains common. These trends are not random: they reflect, and in turn reshape, deeper social transformations in secularisation, the changing position of women, individualisation, and state policy. Crucially, the trends are also a methodological minefield — what marriage and divorce statistics appear to show depends heavily on how they are constructed — so a strong candidate handles the figures critically rather than treating them as transparent facts. This lesson examines the trends, the sociological explanations for them, and a structured evaluation suitable for the highest exam bands.
Key Definition: Secularisation is the long-term process by which religious belief, practice and institutional authority decline in social significance. It is repeatedly invoked to explain why marriage, divorce and cohabitation patterns have changed — but, as the evaluation shows, it is one factor among several, not a single master-cause.
This lesson addresses a core bullet of the AQA A-Level Sociology (7192) Paper 2, Section A — Families and Households content:
You should be able to describe (AO1) the trends and the explanations (secularisation, women's position, legal change, individualisation, Giddens' transformation of intimacy); apply (AO2) them to an Item; and evaluate (AO3) by interrogating the statistics, weighing structural vs choice explanations, and assessing the New Right and feminist readings of divorce. The material overlaps directly with the family-diversity and personal-life lessons.
The number of marriages in England and Wales has fallen substantially since the early 1970s:
| Year | Marriages (England & Wales) | Key Context |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | ~480,000 (peak) | Post-war baby boomers reaching marriageable age |
| 1992 | ~311,000 | Steady decline |
| 2009 | ~232,000 | Continued fall |
| 2019 | ~213,000 | Among the lowest numbers recorded |
(Treat all figures as approximate; the sociological point is the long-run downward direction and what explains it, not precise totals.)
| Factor | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Changing attitudes / declining stigma | Marriage is no longer treated as compulsory; cohabitation and births outside marriage have lost their stigma |
| Secularisation | Fewer people feel a religious obligation to marry; marriage becomes a personal choice rather than a sacred duty |
| Changing position of women | Greater educational and economic independence means women are less financially dependent on marriage |
| Rising cohabitation | Many treat cohabitation as a precursor or alternative; the legal/social gap with marriage has narrowed |
| Fear of divorce | High divorce rates may deter some from formal commitment |
| Cost | The expense of a formal wedding deters or delays some couples |
Cohabitation: an arrangement in which two people who are not married or in a civil partnership live together in an intimate relationship.
Cohabitation has grown sharply: from a small minority of couples in the late 1970s to a substantial and rising share today, and it is now the fastest-growing family type in the UK, with cohabiting-couple families more than doubling since the mid-1990s.
Beaujouan and Ní Bhrolcháin (2011) distinguished different meanings of cohabitation:
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| Trial marriage | A "test" before deciding whether to marry |
| Prelude to marriage | Couples intending to marry who cohabit first for practical reasons |
| Alternative to marriage | A deliberately preferred long-term arrangement, rejecting marriage |
| Alternative to being single | Shorter-term cohabitation for companionship or convenience |
The point is that cohabitation is not one thing: the same demographic category contains very different relationship projects.
Divorce in England and Wales rose steeply across the twentieth century, then declined from its early-1990s peak:
| Year | Divorces (England & Wales) | Key Context |
|---|---|---|
| 1931 | ~4,000 | Divorce difficult and heavily stigmatised |
| 1961 | ~27,000 | Gradual increase |
| 1971 | ~74,000 | Divorce Reform Act 1969 takes effect |
| 1993 | ~165,000 | Peak |
| 2019 | ~107,000 | Decline from peak (partly fewer marriages) |
| 2022 | ~80,000 | No-fault divorce introduced |
A commonly cited estimate is that around four in ten marriages end in divorce. (Note the recent fall: a frequent exam error is to assume divorce is still rising.)
| Legislation | Key Change |
|---|---|
| Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 | Allowed divorce through the courts (previously needing an Act of Parliament) |
| Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 | Made divorce affordable for ordinary people via legal aid |
| Divorce Reform Act 1969 (effective 1971) | Made "irretrievable breakdown" the sole ground; no need to prove a "guilty party" |
| Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 | Allowed divorce after one year of marriage (previously three) |
| Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 (effective 2022) | Introduced no-fault divorce — either party can apply without blame; quicker, less adversarial |
| Explanation | Detail |
|---|---|
| Legal changes | Easier, cheaper, less stigmatised procedures removed barriers; no-fault divorce (2022) is the latest step. But: law enables divorce, it does not cause unhappiness — it makes existing breakdown visible |
| Secularisation | Fewer view marriage as a sacred, lifelong bond; divorce no longer seen as sinful |
| Rising expectations of marriage | Ronald Fletcher (1966) argued people now expect emotional fulfilment, companionship and sexual satisfaction; unmet, these higher expectations paradoxically raise divorce — a sign marriage is valued more, not less |
| Changing position of women | Paid work and welfare access mean women are less financially trapped; Kurz (1995) and the fact that women petition for the majority of divorces support this |
| Changing attitudes | Divorce is widely seen as a normal life event, not a mark of failure |
| Individualisation | Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (1995) and Giddens (1992): people prioritise personal happiness; the "pure relationship" lasts only while it satisfies |
graph TD
A["Secularisation"] --> Z["Rising divorce in C20th"]
B["Legal change: 1949 / 1969 / 1984"] --> Z
C["Women's economic independence"] --> Z
D["Higher expectations of marriage - Fletcher"] --> Z
E["Individualisation - Giddens / Beck"] --> Z
Z --> F["Peak early 1990s"]
F --> G["Subsequent fall: fewer marriages + later, more selective marriage"]
Anthony Giddens (1992) argued intimate relationships have been transformed in late modernity:
Pure relationship: a relationship entered into for its own sake — for the rewards it gives each partner — rather than for economic need, family pressure or convention. It continues only as long as both partners find it satisfying, so either can leave.
Confluent love: love based on emotional intimacy, equality and mutual self-disclosure, replacing romantic love (the "one true love forever" ideal). Being conditional, it lasts only while fulfilment continues.
Giddens argued these shifts were driven especially by women demanding more equal, emotionally satisfying relationships — a democratisation of personal life. The corollary is that rising divorce reflects not the failure of relationships but rising standards for them.
| View | Argument |
|---|---|
| New Right | Divorce harms children — loss of a father figure, instability, greater risk of underachievement and anti-social behaviour |
| Feminists | Divorce can benefit children by removing them from conflict-ridden or abusive homes; staying together "for the children" may do more harm |
| Research | Rodgers and Pryor (1998) found children of divorced parents face, on average, somewhat greater risks (behavioural difficulties, lower attainment), but the differences are modest and poverty and parental conflict predict outcomes more strongly than divorce itself |
The specification's bullet explicitly includes childbearing, and the trends here closely track those in marriage and cohabitation. The proportion of births occurring outside marriage has risen dramatically — from a small minority in the 1970s to around half of all births today. Crucially, however, the majority of these births are registered by both parents living at the same address, which means most are to cohabiting couples rather than to lone mothers. This statistic is a powerful corrective to the New Right narrative: the decoupling of childbearing from marriage does not mean the decoupling of childbearing from partnership.
Several further childbearing trends are examinable:
The sociological reading is that childbearing has become less governed by the institution of marriage and more a matter of personal decision — shaped by secularisation, women's autonomy and individualisation — without becoming detached from committed partnership for most people.
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